REMARKS

Claims 1, 2, 4, 7-21, 23-41 and 44-55 are currently pending in the application. These same claims have been variously rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over root reference U.S. Patent No. 6,401,084 (Ortega et al.) in view of U.S. Patent No. 6,006,225 (Bowman et al.) and other references.

As a preliminary matter, Applicants respectfully request that the Information Disclosure Statements filed October 23, 2001, January 15, 2002, and March 25, 2004 be acknowledge by the Examiner.

Also, applicant respectfully ask that the Examiner contact the undersigned at 206-903-2461 to discuss this response, should the arguments herein not be considered persuasive. Applicants have given extensive thought to the Examiner's most recent Office Action, and believe that the current remarks address the Examiner's concerns.

Rejection of Claims Under § 112, ¶ 2

Claim 35 has been rejected as being indefinite because, in the Examiner's words, the limitation "'near the input mechanism, third displaying...' fails to define the degree of nearness between input mechanism and third displaying" (Office Action, p. 3).

Applicants turn the Examiner's attention to Fig. 5A. (*see also* p. 20 of the Application). In Fig. 5A, it is clear that the link 520A is near the query input mechanism (which contains input 510A). Thus, it is improper to construe the term "near" as anywhere within a window screen (Office Action, p. 3).

The Applicants are aware of the fact that limitations cannot be read from the written description and the drawings into the claims. However, Applicants contend that the term is definite as used in this application, especially the way it has been defined in Fig. 5A (and 5C, for that matter—and p. 20 of the Application).

Rejection of Claims Under §103(a)

In rejecting independent claims 1, 19, and 40, the Examiner has made the following remarks:

> Ortega does not explicitly teach analyzing and determining "for each word" in the query, although the teaching strongly suggests analyzing and determining *all* words in the query term to differentiate matching and non-matching terms.

(Office Action, p. 8) (emphasis added). Applicants respectfully submit that this observation is off-point. As the Applicants have already made clear in previous remarks, the reason why Ortega et al. cannot teach the limitation of "analyzing the spelling of the at least one word and determining, for each word, whether the at least one word has a mistake" (claims 1, 19, and 40) is because what Ortega et al. actually does is leverage an *already* correct spelling of one term (the matching term) to get at the correct spelling of a second term (the non-matching term). Put another way, Ortega et al. *must* presuppose that there is at least one *already* correct spelling – otherwise Ortega et al. will not work. This much is a technological fact of Ortega et al.

In light of these facts, saying that "Ortega ... strongly suggests analyzing and determining *all* words in the query term to differentiate matching and non-matching terms" is off-point. Differentiation of terms is not what Ortega discloses or focuses on – rather, it focuses on leveraging the already correct spelling of one term to obtain another term. Ortega et al., therefore, cannot *determine* the correct spelling of *all* the words (or *each* of the words): "analyzing the spelling of the at least one word and *determining, for each word*, whether the at least one word has a mistake" (claim 1, 19, and 40).

The Applicants hope their position is clear. Again, if the Examiner wants to discuss this issue further, the Applicants ask the Examiner contact the undersigned at 206-903-2461.

Next, turning to the last independent claim, claim 35, the Examiner has stated the following:

> [T]he Applicant argued that the Ortega reference does not teach a link comprising an entered query data set ... the Examiner [thus] ... re-visited the subject matter by combining the teachings of [1] multiple displaying(s), [2] link addresses and [3] query entries from the Ortega reference under 35 USC § 103(a), to provide the teaching for rejecting the claimed subject matter

(Office Action, pp. 24-25). Applicants once again point out that the preset and static hyperlinks ("Author Search Tips", "ISBN", etc.) disclosed in Ortega et al. differ from the kinds of links claimed: "wherein the link at least in part comprises of the entered query data set" (claim 35). These latter claimed links are not static, but rather comprise of (at least in part) whatever query data is entered. As such, they differ in kind from the type of links disclosed in Ortega et al.

The Applicants remind the Examiner that "[t]o establish prima facie obviousness of a claimed invention, *all* the claim limitations must be taught or suggested by the prior art" MPEP § 2143 (emphasis added). The Applicants contend that Ortega et al. does not disclose a "link [that] at least in part comprises of the entered query data set" (claim 35).

In conclusion, independent claims 1, 19, 35, and 40 recite limitations which cannot be found in the cited references, either alone or in combination. Dependent claims 2, 4, 7-18, 20-21, 23-34, 36-39, 41 and 44-55 depend from claims 1, 19, 35 or 40 and are believed to be allowable for the same reasons. Applicants thus submit that claims 1-2, 4, 7-21, 23-41 and 44-55 patentably define over Ortega et al., taken alone or in combination with any other art of record. Withdrawal of the rejections to claims 1-2, 4, 7-21, 23-41 and 44-55 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is thus earnestly requested.

Conclusion

Applicants believe that the present Amendment is responsive to each of the points raised by the Examiner in the Office Action, and submit that claims 1-2, 4, 7-21, 23-41 and 44-55 of the application are in condition for allowance. Favorable consideration and passage to issue of the application at the Examiner's earliest convenience is earnestly solicited.

Date: May 10, 2006



Grzegorz S. Plichta
Registration No. 55,541

Woodcock Washburn LLP
One Liberty Place - 46th Floor
Philadelphia PA 19103
Telephone: (215) 568-3100
Facsimile: (215) 568-3439